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by Michael Fedock 
There was a time in America when life 
was more simple than it is today. People 
conducted their affairs in a personal and 
direct manner and the authority of gov-
ernmental bodies was not challenged 
with the frequency that it is today. With 
the passage of time and the tremendous 
growth of society, this apparent simplic-
ity has disappeared. As a society we 
have responded to this change by creat-
ing a bureaucracy and proliferating the 
many agencies which comprise it. 
Administrative law involves the crea-
tion and operation of administrative 
agencies, as well as the degree of control 
exercised over them by the courts. 
Whenever a governmental administra-
tive agency exercises a judicial or quasi-
judicial power, it must comply with the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
standard of due process requires that the 
liberty or property of the citizen be 
protected by basic elements of fair play 
in administrative proceedings. This is 
true even though the procedure of ad-
ministrative agencies is usually not as 
formal and strict as that of the courts. 
Among the specific due process guaran-
tees to which the citizen is entitled when 
coming before an administrative agency 
is the right to an unbiased and impartial 
decision maker. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 
U.S. 35 (1975); In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133 (1955). 
Many decisions have addressed the 
issue of what constitutes bias on the part 
of the decision maker and under what 
circumstances bias disqualifies a deci-
sion maker. The recent case of Horton-
ville School District No.1 v. Hortonville 
Educ. Ass'n, 96 S.Ct. 2308 (1976), 
provides a new look at the question of 
bias. The petitioners in Hortonville were 
a Wisconsin common school district, the 
school board, its elected part-time 
members, and its agents. The teachers in 
the school district were represented by 
the respondent Hortonville Education 
Association, an affiliate of both the 
largest statewide teachers' labor union 
and the National Education Association. 
On March 18, 1974, the teachers 
within the school district went on strike 
over the terms of the 1974-75 collective 
bargaining agreement which was to take 
effect in the fall of 1974. Consequently, 
schools were forced to close. On both 
March 20 and 23, 1974, the superinten-
dent of the schools invited the teachers 
to return to work. While several teachers 
did return at that time, most remained on 
strike. 
On March 29, 1974, the school board 
began to schedule hearings to determine 
whether the teachers were, in fact, strik-
ing as alleged by the superintendent. In-
dividual hearings were planned pur-
suant to notices sent to each teacher, in-
forming him that he was being charged 
with striking in violation of both the law 
and his contract. The teachers were in-
formed that if these charges were proven 
true, their employment could be termi-
nated. Ultimately, upon the request of 
the teachers, a mass hearing was held. 
Counsel for the teachers objected to 
the board's role as a decision maker be-
cause of its involvement in the manage-
ment of the school district and its in-
volvement in the labor dispute which 
formed the basis for the hearing. Thus 
counsel for the teachers requested that 
an "impartial third party" act as decision 
maker. The request was denied and the 
hearing proceeded. The teachers' attor-
ney made an offer of proof relating to 
prior bargaining between the parties, but 
did not deny that the teachers were, in 
fact, striking. The board rejected the 
offer of proof on the grounds of immate-
riality. At the close of the hearing, the 
board found that the teachers were strik-
ing illegally and resolved to terminate the 
employment contracts of those teachers 
involved and to hire replacement 
teachers. The schools reopened on April 
8,1974. 
On April 4, 1974, the teachers associ-
ation filed a class action suit, as well as a 
show cause order seeking temporary 
and permanent injunctions to enjoin the 
board from hiring replacement teachers. 
The association did not ask that the ter-
minated teachers be reinstated, but did 
ask that the terminations be set aside. 
The association also attempted to enjoin 
the board from hiring replacement 
teachers until such time as the dis-
charged teachers had been afforded a 
"full and fair hearing". 
The Wisconsin Circuit Court denied 
the association's request for a temporary 
restraining order and granted the 
board's motion for summary judgment 
on all issued involving the federal due 
process claim. The teachers association 
appealed this decision to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, which found that the 
board did have the power to discharge 
the striking teachers and decided all state 
law questions in favor of the board. The 
Court also upheld Wisconsin's prohibi-
tion of public employee strikes against 
an equal protection claim. Hortonville 
Edue. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School 
Dist. No.1, 66 Wis. 2d 469,487, 225 
N.W.2d 658,667 (1975). 
The court then turned to the respon-
dents' federal due process claim and 
narrowed the issue to whether there was 
the lack of an impartial decision maker. 
The court held that the respondents 
were denied due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972), the court concluded that even in 
cases in which the facts are undisputed, 
an unbiased decision maker is essential. 
66 Wis. 2d at 493, 225 N. W. 2d at 671. 
The court added: "This is not to suggest, 
of course, that the board members were 
anything but dedicated public servants, 
trying to provide the district with quality 
education while still keeping within its 
limited budget." Id. at 494,225 N.w.2d 
at 671. There was never any allegation 
or finding of a personal or pecuniary bias 
on the part of the board. Nevertheless, 
the court held that' 'the board was not an 
impartial decision maker in a constitu-
tional sense ... " Id. The court's decision 
was limited to this federal procedural 
issue and did not hold that plaintiffs were 
unreasonably discharged. The court 
then directed that the teachers could 
bring an action for de novo review of the 
board's decision. Id. at 498,225 N. W.2d 
at 673. Both parties moved for a rehear-
ing and both motions were denied. The 
board then filed application for the is-
suance of a writ of certiorari with the Su-
preme Court of the United States, which 
granted certiorari. Hortonville Joint 
School Dist. No.1 v. Hortonville Edue. 
Ass'n, 96 S.Ct. 34 (1975). 
The Supreme Court noted that the 
teachers' argument rested on two con-
tentions: first, that the board, because it 
headed the school district, had some 
personal or official stake in the decision 
of whether the teachers should be dis-
missed; and second, that the board had 
manifested bitterness toward the 
teachers because the teachers had 
criticized the board during the strike. The 
Court found that (1) the teachers had 
not shown that the board had the kind of 
personal or financial stake in the decision 
that might create a conflict of interest and 
(2) there was nothing in the record to 
support charges of personal animosity. 
The only other factor utilized by the 
teachers to support their claim of bias 
was the fact that the board was involved 
in the negotiations that preceded and 
precipitated the discharges. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court had held that this 
factor, without more, disqualified the 
board. The U.S. Supreme Court re-
jected this holding. "Mere familiarity 
with the facts of a case gained by an 
agency in the performance of its statu-
tory role does not, however, disqualify a 
decision maker." 96 S.Ct. at 2314. Ul-
timately the Court held: 
Respondents have failed to demon-
strate that the decision to terminate 
their employment was infected by the 
sort of bias that we have held to dis-
qualify other decision makers as a 
matter of federal due process. A show-
ing that the Board was 'involved' in 
the events preceding this decision, in 
light of the important interest in leav-
ing with the Board the power given by 
the state legislature, is not enough to 
overcome the presumption of honesty 
and integrity in policymakers with de-
cision making power. Cf. Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,47 (1975). Ac-
cordingly, we hold that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not guarantee re-
spondents that the decision to termi-
nate their employment would be 
made or reviewed by a body other 
than the School Board. Id. at 2316. 
Maryland decisions are in accord with 
this enunciation by the Supreme Court. 
In Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 
121 A.2d 816 (1955), the Maryland 
Court of Appeals noted that "the 
modern tendency of the courts is toward 
greater liberality in permitting grants of 
discretion to administrative officials in 
order to facilitate the administration of 
the laws as the complexity of gov-
ernmental and economic conditions in-
creases." Id. at 555, 121 A.2d at 822. 
Also in accord with the ruling of the 
high Court is the principle, long recog-
nized in Maryland, that administrative 
decisions carry with them a presumption 
of validity and will only be disturbed on 
review if it can be shown, on the record, 
that there was not substantial evidence 
to support the findings. Dickinson-
Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assess-
ments of Anne Arundel County, 273 
Md. 245,329 A.2d 18 (1974); Heaps v. 
Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45A.2d 73 (1945). 
Therefore, disqualifying bias does not 
exist in a decision maker merely because 
that decision maker is closely connected 
with the subject matter of his decision. 
Bias will not be dealt with as a matter of 
speculation to be drawn from mere cir-
cumstances in which the decision maker 
might find himself. Bias must be shown 
to exist from the facts and must be of 
such personal or pecuniary nature as 
would render the decision maker dis-
qualified. This conclusion is in agree-
ment with the classic statement of the 
United States Court of Appeals in In re 
Linahan, 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943), 
by Peter H. Meyers 
(Reprinted from The Leaflet, 




The U.S. Supreme Court ended its 
1975-76 Term in July with five separate 
decisions Significantly weakening the 
Fourth Amendment's protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure. The 
Court: 
• Ruled 5-4 that police officers can 
constitutionally search the unlocked 
glove compartment of a car impounded 
for traffic Violations, as part of a routine 
"inventory" of the car's contents. In this 
case, police had found a bag of 
marijuana in the glove compartment, 
and the defendant had been convicted 
of possession. The Court's opinion ap-
pears to leave open the question of 
whether a search of a locked glove com-
partment or trunk as part of a routine 
"inventory" would also be constitu-
tional. South Dakota v. Opperman, 44 
U.S.L.W 5294 (July 6, 1976). 
• Ruled 7-2 that a heroin suspect ob-
served by police as she stood in the open 
doorway of her home could be arrested 
without a warrant because the doorway 
of a house which is open to public view 
from the street is equivalent to any other 
"public place". US. v. Santana, 44 
U.S.L.W 4970 (June 25, 1976). The 
Court held earlier this Term that a war-
rantless arrest in a public place upon 
probable cause would not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
that "[i]f, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' 
be defined to mean the total absence of 
pre-conceptions in the mind of the 
judge, then no one has ever had a fair 
trial and no one ever will .... In addition 
to those acquired social value judg-
ments, every judge, however, unavoid-
ably has many idiosyncratic 'learnings of 
the mind', uniquely personal prejudices, 
which may interfere with his fairness at a 
trial. ... Frankly, to recognize the exis-
tence of such prejudices is the part of 
• Ruled 5-3 that the Fourth Amend-
ment's exclusionary rule does not forbid 
the use in a federal civil proceeding of 
evidence seized unconstitutionally, but 
in good faith, by state police officers. 
US. v. Janis, 44 U.S.L. W. 5303 (July 6, 
1976). The Court specifically left open 
the questions of whether evidence 
seized unconstitutionally by state police 
could be used in a state civil proceeding, 
and whether evidence seized unconstitu-
tionally by federal police could be used 
in a federal civil proceeding. 
• Ruled 6-3 that "where the State 
has provided an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment 
claim, a state prisoner may not be 
granted federal habeas corpus relief on 
the ground that evidence obtained in an 
unconstitutional search or seizure was in-
troduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell, 
wisdom. The conscientious judge will, as 
far as possible, make himself aware of his 
biases of this character, and, by that very 
self knowledge, nullify their effect." Id. at 
651-52. 
Such principles are necessary in order 
to maintain the balance between the in-
dividual's right to due process and the 
interest of the state in seeing to it that its 
agencies administer certain aspects of 
government with a maximum of effec-
tiveness. 
photo by June Chaplin 
44 U.S.L.W. 5313 (July 6,1976). This 
decision means that, except in very rare 
instances, only the Supreme Court, and 
not the lower federal courts, can con-
sider whether evidence obtained in an 
unconstitutional search was introduced 
in a state trial. With the Supreme Court's 
heavy caseload, it will hear only a small 
number of these cases. 
• Ruled 7-2 that Border Patrol offi-
cials at fixed checkpoints on U.S. high-
ways near international borders may 
stop a vehicle and question its occupants 
about their right to be in this country, 
even without a reasonable suspicion that 
the vehicle contains illegal aliens. US. v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, U.S.L.W 5336 (July 6, 
1976). Last Term, the Court held that 
roving border patrols could not stop a 
vehicle without a reasonable suspicion 
that it contained illegal aliens. 
